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Abstract 
As the concept of "safety culture," however, contains abstract elements, it is difficult to find a way to establish it in a specific 
manner in an organization, resulting in the current failure of its effective  development. The result of developing a specific 
method for evaluating safety culture (SCAT: Safety Culture Assessment Tool) from the perspective of safety management in 
industrial organizations is reported. In addition, a comprehensive program for the continuous assessment and improvement of a 
safety culture (PDCA cycle) based on the use of SCAT, as a strategy for developing a safety culture, is examined and proposed. 
For contribution to further studies, reflections were also given on problems with activities for improving and entrenching a sound 
safety culture in an organization. 
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1. The background and purpose of this study 
As there have been still various accidents and troubles frequently in recent years, the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry of Japan has conducted a survey on direct causes for industrial accidents that have occurred 
since 2002. Its result shows that more than 70% of all accidents were caused by human factors including 
mismanipulation, misjudgement, and defective manuals. In particular, it was indicated that 90% of accidents that 
had occurred in the steel industry were caused by human factors [1]. Consequently, how to prevent a human error 
has been on agenda at the front line, and much activity has actually been c arried out for this purpose. 
As a part of those measures for preventing human errors, the concept of safety culture has gradually been 
accepted not only by the nuclear power industry, in which it originated, but also by other industries. The concept 
of "safety culture," to begin with, was first introduced by the investigation report on the Chernobyl Accident which 
occurred in 1986 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Summary Report on the Post-accident 
Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident [2]. Although the cause of Chernobyl Accident was initially attributed 
to an "operator error," as the post-accident investigation proceeded, it was revealed that the main cause of the 
accident was not an operator error but many complex organizational factor s. An effective regulatory scheme was 
not established at the national level. No adequate safety analysis was made by the designers and at the plant level. 
In addition, due to the sloppy maintenance of rules and procedures, a system was not established that  adequately 
ensure the safety of the reactor. Consequently, it ended up as an accident whose root causes were indicated to be the 
nature of the former USSR society and the "absence of safety culture" in the nuclear power management 
organization.  
Also in Japan, due to successive waves of scandals such as the Criticality Accident at JCO's Tokai nuclear fuel 
plant in 1999 and TEPCO's cover-up of nuclear reactor problems in 2002, the importance of organizational climate, 
such as an entire organization's attitude and behaviors toward safety, came to be further recognized, and it came to be 
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strongly demanded to develop an organizational climate for ensuring safety, that is, safety culture. As the concept of 
"safety culture," however, contains too abstract elements, no way is found to establish it in a specific manner in an 
organization. This bottleneck has resulted in the current failure of its effective development. This study is thus 
intended to examine strategies for developing a safety culture in an industrial  organization from the perspective of 
safety management.  
2. Perspective of safety management 
There are two mistaken ideas about a human error which are often heard at the front line of an industrial 
organization [3]. One is fatalism about a human error. Specifically it rests on the recognition that humans are  
error-prone creatures. Therefore, a human error is unavoidable, and nothing can be done about it. We should thus be 
resigned about it. Such is the attitude taken by fatalists about a human error. Ano ther is responsibilism, so to speak, 
about a human error. This is an idea based on a short-sighted response which tries to call attention by pursuing the 
responsibility of an individual who caused an error and punishing him/her. As may have already been un derstood, 
fatalism as a causal account does not contribute at all to preventing a human error, and responsibilism cannot be 
said to be scientific in developing countermeasures. Accidents will never be eliminated if the parties to an accident 
are found fault with and punished or dismissed to address the cause of the accident. It must be recognized that any 
person inherently has a possibility to cause an accident if placed under certain circumstances since human 
behaviors fluctuate. An approach based on science does not stop at determining the responsibility for an accident 
but actively pursue the root cause for its occurrence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As indicated in the Figure 1, at a workplace, individuals work under the support of an organization (such as 
structure and institution). Behaviors of a human being as an organism are not always in a steady state but have 
constant fluctuations (characteristic nature of human beings). Traditional studies on human factors have 
conceivably been intended to minimize such "fluctuations." We think, however, that such approaches must 
probably be efforts that can only be "left to the hand of God." Based on this view, there are no means of response 
available to us human beings than controlling the "organizational factors" constru cted by human beings. There is 
no doubt such "organizational factors" can be controlled "since they were created by us human beings." Under this 
conception, it is aimed at to make an error remain a near miss even in the worst case and to prevent it from le ading 
to a large accident even if the error is committed by a human being. In short, in many cases, an event which is 
described as a human error is, in fact, not the result of inappropriate behaviors by individuals but something whose 
cause should be attributed to an administrative flaw of an organizational system. Let us note that the greatest 
agenda for safety management is how to improve the safety management system of an organization.   
Fig. 1. Perspective of safety management 
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3. Strategies for developing a safety culture 
3.1 Grasping an organization's state of safety 
As the first step in constructing a safety culture in an organization, it is indispensable to grasp its existing state 
of safety and clarify its weakness. One of major issues in grasping the current situation is, however, how to 
recognize and evaluate a safety culture. Consequently, in response to a voice from the front line, "A safety culture 
is abstract and difficult to understand," let us introduce a method for measuring a safety culture developed by the 
Institute for Science of Labour in Japan, to which the authors belong, and a sample result of its application, as an 
example of research working on the "visualization" of safety culture [4]. 
First, items falling under the "mechanism for safety assurance (scheme, mean, and activity)" were extracted 
from those concerning an operating organization (756 in total) in the ASCOT Guidelines proposed by IAEA. Those 
items are in 10 areas: "safety statement," "safety and productivity," "rules and documentation," "responsibility, 
authority, and roles," "troubleshooting," "education and training," "information channel and communication," 
"working conditions," "institution and activities," and "cooperation with outsiders." Next, core assessment items 
were selected from each of these areas to elaborate (a total of 36) items/questions for assessing "safety attitudes 
and behaviors."  
Another important component of safety culture is the "extent to which safety attitudes and behaviors are 
shared." Since a safety culture is a culture, its important ele ment is "whether safety attitudes and behaviors are 
shared by members of an organization." As one way to have this element reflected in assessing each of those items 
we formulated, members of an operating organization were classified into three cohorts (oc cupational 
groups)—"managers," "field supervisors," and "operators"—and asked to evaluate each other in three ways 
(between managers and supervisors, managers and operators, and supervisors and operators). The gaps between 
ratings by different cohorts thus obtained were used as a rating for the extent to which "safety attitudes and 
behaviors" are shared. Thirty-six assessment items/questions mentioned above and this framework of evaluation 
thus created are named "SCAT: Safety Culture Assessment Tool." 
The example shown in the radar chart in Figure 2 is the result of the evaluation of managers at one business 
establishment using SCAT. The result clearly shows that the self -evaluation score by managers is greater than 
ratings by other cohorts, both supervisors and operators, in every area of assessment and that there are large gaps 
in ratings in two items: "safety and productivity" and "information channel and communication." Represented in 
this way, the result gives clues for what the problems are for improving the organizational safety culture in this 
establishment and what they should start with in taking countermeasures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the SCAT provides a framework for the comprehensive assessment of an organization in terms of 
safety culture based on two indices of rating and rating gap (abbreviated as SCAT-MAP). Under this framework, 
rating gaps between cohorts (called G scores) are taken along the vertical axis, and ratings for items (called E 
Fig. 2. Result of measurement using SCAT 
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scores) are taken along the horizontal axis. The relative position of a given organization is to be found on the basis 
of these two dimensions. The following is how it works. By combining different types of G scores and E scores, 
safety culture levels are categorized into four types (GE, Ge, gE, and ge), making it possible to classify every 
organization into one of these types. These four types are characterized as follows.  
Type GE (high item ratings and small rating gaps): Although this is an ideal type from the perspective of safety 
culture, an organization of this type can be complacent. 
Type Ge (low item ratings and small rating gaps): Although the ratings in safety attitudes and behaviors are 
generally low with an organization of this type, it is easy to be united in introducing new measures becaus e of 
small rating gaps. It can therefore be expected to improve. It can, however, be said to be in a stagnant state at 
present. 
Type gE (high item ratings and large rating gaps): Although the ratings in safety attitudes and behaviors are 
generally high with an organization of this type, its problem is large rating gaps among cohorts. It can be united as 
an organization by eliminating the difference in mutual recognition through increasing exchanges among cohorts. 
At present, however, distrust is considered to exist among cohorts. 
Type ge (low item ratings and large rating gaps): Since the ratings in safety attitudes and behaviors are generally 
low and rating gaps are large among cohorts, this type of organization needs a significant organizational 
reformation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Detecting an organization's vulnerabilities by using SCAT 
A comparison of organizations becomes possible by grasping the characteristics of the safety culture of each 
organization as a whole and using SCAT-MAP at the same time. In addition, representing results of evaluation for 
each assessment area and item in an organization on this SCAT-MAP enables detecting its vulnerabilities with 
greater specificity. The results of assessment of many business establishments which so far bee n made by the 
Institute for Science of Labour are shown on the SCAT-MAP (Figure 4). Representing the results on such a map 
makes the relative position of the safety culture of a given business establishment clear at a glance and enables its 
comparison with other establishments.  
3.3 Identifying elements impeding safety culture and creating responses  
A necessary step after detecting vulnerabilities of an organization by using SCAT is to clarify what lets such 
vulnerabilities exist in the organization (factors inhibiting safety culture). Unless factors inhibiting safety culture  
are identified and steps are taken to address them, it will not lead to the fundamental solution of problems. An   
Fig. 3. Assessment Model Using SCAT-MAP 
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interview (interview method) is one of effective ways to probe for the background factors for the problems. It is 
effective to analyze the background factors by conducting a detailed hearing concerning problems detected by 
SCAT with randomly selected members of each of cohorts (managers, supervisors, and operators) about the routine 
state of operations (management, behavior patterns, attitudes, human relations, etc.) of the entire organization 
including teams and individuals. If, in addition, appropriate steps are taken to address the group of causes 
abstracted, the strategy for ensuring safety will advance further. One such example is shown in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Entrenching a safety culture by PDCA 
Once the construction of a safety culture has been achieved, the next problem is that an industrial organization 
as an organism will immediately let fading of effectiveness start inside, as is obvious from the existing findings in 
organizational research. Therefore, we propose a program of running the following PDCA cycle in order to 
entrench a safety culture in an organization. (1) Identify the weakness of an organization through a survey using 
Opinions of the Management  Opinions of the Front Line 
Operators work in accordance with the rules only 
when we conduct a field patrol.  
Managers do not understand the actual situation at 
the front line. 
Regrettably, we cannot leave things to the front line  
as things stand now. 
There are many rules and manuals that do not match 
the situation on the front line.  
An opinion that 100% performance in both 
production and safety is impossible is an excuse.  
Managers demand incompatible things such as both 
"improving productivity" and "complete conformity 
to the rules." 
The reason why lessons learned do not spread 
horizontally is that the front-line people have an 
attitude that "that has nothing to do with me."  
Managers do not respond even if we make a request 
for improvement. 
Proposal (Countermeasures):  
1. Reflect the opinions of the front line in making rules.  
2. Review the way of field patrol.  
Fig. 4. Examples of the Assessment of Numerous Business Establishments Represented 
on a SCAT㸫MAP 
Table 1. Example of the result of a hearing based on SCAT 
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SCAT. (2) Corroborate the weakness identified by a hearing survey. (3) Create and implement a response to the 
weakness confirmed, for each of three cohorts (managers, supervisors, and operators) (a yearly program by 
default). (4) Inspect the course of implementation by monitoring surveys (every 3 month by default). Revise the 
program if there is a delay in implementation. (5) Conduct a SCAT survey again to measure the effect of the 
response. 
An important point at the stage of drafting the response is to focus on a single specific measure that is feasible 
as much as possible. A measure which tends to be all-encompassing such as "improving communication within an 
organization" or "making communication smoother" blurs its focus and makes the scope of activities too wide. The 
key point is that all members of the organization work together on even a single small program throughout a year 
and obtain the sense of achievement (success experience). This experience of achievement has been found to lead 
to a concomitant improvement (as a side effect) in other weaknesses of the organization which have not been 
covered by the response taken.    
4. Discussion 
A comprehensive program for developing a safety culture (PDCA cycle) primarily by using SCAT from the 
perspective of safety management in order to prevent human errors was examined and proposed. It goes without 
saying that extremely slow and steady efforts are required for developing and entrenching a safety culture in an 
existing organization. Since this is an activity to create a culture in an organization, it is unavoidable that it takes 
time. Nonetheless, upon witnessing the nuclear power plant accident at Fukushima, which occurred in Japan (see 
the Interim Report by the Accident Investigation Committee of the Japan ’s Government and other documents for 
details), we think that we are compelled to incorporate a safety culture into corporate activities in the future even 
if it takes time.   
Safety consciousness and behavior are acquired not naturally but only as a result of the effective deploy ment of 
various activities. Therefore, although it is necessary to evaluate the result, what is more important is that an 
organization constructs "a mechanism for continuously improving safety" and has substantial routine activities for 
enhancing safety. In addition, it can be said to be even more important to monitor the soundness of the mechanism 
by focusing on the "process" leading to the result, for instance, whether the mechanism is actually functioning or 
not. In short, the approach consisting of "the continuous assessment and improvement of a safety culture in an 
organization and the inspection of the course of their implementation" is the key for developing a safety culture. 
Lastly, let us indicate the following problems as the future agenda for organizations in implementing "an approach 
toward the continuous improvement of a safety culture."  
First, it is a requisite condition for the continuous improvement of a safety culture that a group which is in the 
center of an organization and plays a central role in the management of an organization undergoes "cognitive 
transformation" (changes their current conception of safety management). In reality, however, there may be no 
members of the organization in question who may work on this group for such transformation. That is, members of 
such a group have to tackle a very difficult task of "urging themselves to change themselves." Let us note that this 
is a task which can only be achieved by people who have a great enthusiasm for safety problems and have an 
excellent self-insight.  
Next, it is important that all members of an organization share the recognition that it is difficult to show the 
effect of measures concerning organizational attributes such as culture or climate that are difficult to observe 
directly in a short-term and in a tangible manner. In cases often actually observed, people hastily demand some 
results or argue for or against the measure in question in a short -sighted manner, saying "Nothing has changed" or 
"It became rather more difficult to do such and such." Demanding results in a short-sighted manner lowers the 
motivation of members of the organization, which can stagnate or frustrate activities for improving a safety culture. 
All members of the organization must be aware of the fact that developing a culture takes a long time before they 
start this. 
Thirdly, there are diverse implications of the word "culture". Some specific examples of behaviors are what 
suggest them: arbitrarily setting the goal of a safety culture, saying, "Now this is enough," arbitrarily setting the 
balance between safety and productivity (putting a greater priority on money than culture), or eliminating elements 
which are not reducible to procedures ("I cannot deal with such a vague thing as culture"). We must be aware  of the 
fact that a culture is something that exists behind specific procedures and becomes manifest only after you have 
become familiar with procedures. In other words, this is an idea that there is no end to the development of a culture 
and that it must be continued without interruption. Once you stop your thinking and activity, it starts retrogress ion. 
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